Editor’s Note: This contribution is brought to you by Isaac Sackville-Adjei, a recent Master’s graduate from the University of St Andrews.
In a changing geopolitical environment, political insights must factor in changes and interactions that go beyond states and countries to understand how insecurity is being generated. With the first entry of this month’s Latin America Dispatches, I want to focus on a problem endemic to the region, gangs and mercenaries, by deep-diving recent issues in Haiti.
The spectre of Erik Prince spells bad news for Haiti
Haiti, the most populous country in the Caribbean, and located about 2000 miles south-east of Florida, has a long and troubled history. Economically stagnant and suffering from underdeveloped housing, infrastructure, sanitation and most other metrics for human development, Haiti’s development has been further held back by exploitation from corrupt politicians and violent criminal gangs alike (it should be noted that the historical causes for Haiti’s current conditions are anything but indigenous; Frances punitive economic conditions in the wake of an acrimonious war for Haitian independence stunted meaningful economic or institutional maturity while constant US meddling in the 20th century constricted Haiti’s right to self-determination and political autonomy. Unfortunately, in keeping with the short-form ethos of the dispatches project, that is the extent of the elaboration I will provide on the post-colonial scars and neo-imperialism in Haiti).
The unrest in Haiti has only accelerated in recent years; the assassination of former President Jovenel Moïse proved a catalyst for political violence, while also creating a security vacuum in which criminal gangs have thrived and expanded their grip on the island. The situation is so dire that the UN has warned that the warring gangs control a majority share of territory in the nation’s capital, Port-au-Prince. Already, hundreds upon hundreds have been killed in violent gang massacres in Haiti, as well as more targeted attacks on government officials and journalists.
The UN’s most recent effort to quell the violence, a detachment of mostly Kenyan police officers deployed last summer, has done little to decelerate the violent spiral seizing the island. Efforts were always likely to be insufficient in meeting the crisis in Haiti, but were fatally meagre as a result of underfunding and lacklustre international support.
Enter Erik Prince
Prince is the owner of various private military companies (PMCs) including the now dissolved “Blackwater Worldwide”. Blackwater gained infamy and global attention in 2007, after guards from the company massacred 17 Iraqi civilians while being contracted by the US military. Prince has been a longstanding Trump ally, donating $250,000 to his 2016 campaign and offering consul during his transition. The good will was reciprocated in 2020, when Trump made the ominous gesture to pardon 4 guards found guilty for their role in the 2007 massacre.
Prince still runs various military organisations operating globally – all of which deserve greater scrutiny than they receive – but he has most recently drawn attention for signing a security and policing contract with the beleaguered Haitian government. Details on the contract are scarce, but Prince’s clandestine task force is said to be focusing on deploying drones to identify and kill high value targets; since operations began in March they are yet to eliminate a single high-value target.
The entrance of Prince into Haitian affairs spells bad news for a plethora of reasons. Perhaps most obviously, as learned during the wars against terror, drones are not the tool of scalpel-like precision that many naively presumed them to be. A human rights organisation in Port-au-Prince says more than 200 people have been killed by the drone attacks, but it is unclear how many of these people were actually members or affiliates of violent gangs.
Prince has been able to circumvent congressional oversight by signing a contract directly with the Haitian government, rather than having that contract be awarded to them by the US military, as is more common for PMCs. As such, much about Prince’s modus operandi, the scale of collateral damage and the extent of his ties with the Haitian government is indiscernible at this time. Since PMCs are naturally inclined to prioritise profit over all else, and since Prince’s team has an undue amount of latitude in selecting their methods and means, operational objectives are liable to supersede humanitarian and civilian concerns.
Moreover, the level of confidentiality Prince has achieved between his organisations and the Haitian government leaves the door open for all manner of corruption. Across the world, corrupt governments often use the veil of secrecy inherent in most military contracts as cover to extract personal profit, or award them to whichever organisation is willing to offer them the highest kickbacks; neither of which are conducive to fiscal responsibility or security efficacy.
Haitian finances have always been bedeviled by corrupt politicians, and it is naive to think this isn’t a likelihood as PMCs become greater entrenched in Haitian public life. Already there is talk of Prince’s people being used to support public services such as transport, revenue collection and customs. These are all services identified by corruption scholars as prime targets to extract money from public coffers, and given the track record of both Prince and Haiti, this is a pattern likely to repeat itself if the relationship here deepens.
Gang violence and political turmoil are so endemic within Haitian society, so even if Prince’s team is able to meet all of their goals, they will be unable to resolve the root causes of these issues. It’s unclear how long Haiti will be contracting Prince for, but be it 6 months or a decade, sooner or later, they will leave; when they do, Haitian national security forces will be no better off for it. In outsourcing this work, the Haitian government has prevented their police and military from gaining the experience and institutional knowledge that could be used in the long term to more effectively counter violence and establish secuirty. When Prince’s team leave, so will most of the expertise and experience accrued, leaving Haiti little better off than before they arrived.
I’ve focused on this issue not just because I believe Haiti deserves more recognition, but because I believe it may indicate troubling trends within our global system and for Latin America especially. Firstly, I believe it suggests an element of cronyism is seeping into international security affairs, a trend which may encourage conflict and deepen human suffering. As aforementioned, Erik Prince is a key Trump ally, and although Trump hasn’t made any comments regarding this development, it is unlikely Prince was able to forge this deal without the permission of Trump and his circle. Using PMCs to resolve complex security situations is often likely to garner unsatisfactory results, but their efficacy and conduct may be even more defective if awarded exclusively to Trump allies; people like Prince who demonstrate less care for civilian life and less compunction regarding from whom they accept contracts.
Since the end of US involvement in conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, contracts have dried up for PMCs. Increasingly, they are seeing Latin America as something of a growth market. This has accelerated by the Trump administration’s retrenchment of US foreign policy, divesting from aid and security initiatives worldwide, creating conditions for conflict and vacuums for power.
By no means has the UN been an exemplar of conflict resolution and peacebuilding – their failures are long and storied. But just because it could be better doesn’t mean it can’t get worse. To replace UN peacekeeping with PMC contract work, to place this imperative work in the hands of individuals such as Prince motivated not by idealism or humanitarian concerns, but solely by power and private profit – that can only make the world a worse place.