As a Y7 representative of UK youth on ecological crises to the G7, I was responsible for representing the views of young people from the UK about ecological and climate crises to G7 leaders. Out of all the interesting and tiring parts of the summit, what truly made my experience was the incredible young people I worked with. I saw how diplomats negotiated the practicalities of different government structures, laws, political stances and interests. My fellow climate delegates had extremely detailed knowledge of their country’s policies and culture, requiring the same standard of myself.
Thus, I was surprised to learn, not from the G7 organisation themselves but from a Reuters article, that climate change had been removed from the G7 agenda. This was justified in an official press conference given by Monique Barbut, the French Environment Minister, as a ‘practical’ change, or as a way to stop ‘certain partners’, meaning the US, walking away from negotiations. Though several statements mentioned issues such as ocean protection and biodiversity, climate change is not mentioned, with targets taking an ecological focus.
To understand this decision, it is important to also understand the origins and intentions of the G7 conference. The original G6, including the US, UK, Japan, France, Italy and West Germany, met in 1975 to discuss a response to the economic pressures of the time. It was intended as a platform for non-communist, like-minded nations to discuss their shared problems during an era of Cold War tensions. Canada would soon join to form the G7. Non-member countries, such as Vietnam and Saudi Arabia, who are not democracies, nor share similar stances on some geopolitical and social issues, have been invited to participate in discussions. However, participants are not allocated the influence of members, and as a result cannot decide the final agenda. Shared ideology, as well as a significant amount of wealth and influence, was the historical, unofficial criteria of G7 membership, which still remains relevant today.
The current G7 is an international conference between 7 countries; the UK, France, the US, Canada, Italy, Germany, and Japan. The European Union has also participated since 1981, represented by the European Council, who are the leaders of EU member states, and the European Commission, the EU’s executive body. These administrations meet to discuss current social, geopolitical, economic and environmental problems, at the end releasing a communiqué which details their next steps in tackling global issues. Crucially, this communiqué is a joint statement, based on consensual agreement by all members.
Consensus diplomacy, in which a unanimous final document must be agreed by members, has palpable limits demonstrated by the recent removal of climate change from the G7 agenda. The tensions between the practicalities of consensus, including accommodating certain members’ views, and the principle of addressing current, global crises based on shared values are at a breaking point.
The G7 conference, though it analyses policy and proposes change, is also fundamentally a forum to reaffirm peace and alignment between allies. It does not have the capability to mobilise private, military or state resources, and as a result their outcomes are limited to propositions. In addition, they are not reviewing the effects of a particular policy or event, but look to guide future policy-making bodies. This is significant for two reasons. Firstly, the G7 is an informal meeting of state representatives, rather than a conference with a formal mandate organised by international organisations such as the UN. Diplomats’ final recommendations are written in communiqués, not international law. This gives the G7 the flexibility to remove agenda items, and members, as they see fit.
Secondly, the aim of the conference is to align politically and practically on countries’ priorities and next steps, rather than to enact global, concrete solutions. For example, recommendations to reduce greenhouse gas emissions can only be so effective without China or India at the table. Instead, G7 countries, which I saw reflected in the Y7 communiqué, draft convictions and roadmaps for themselves, and then call on outside countries to join. For this I can speak from my own experience as part of the G7’s youth engagement group on ecological crises. This group allows youth representatives from each member country to collate their own communiqué to present to the G7 leaders. Presenting a consensual stance to world leaders was stressed as paramount, so serious that the entire negotiating table was awake until 3am trying to agree on single bullet points. Any proposal that is not affirmed by every member, regardless of how well-written, is watered down or scrapped.
For these reasons, the removal of climate change from the G7 agenda follows logically. The Trump administration has been rolling back environmental protection, including the 2009 endangerment finding which underpins much of the USA’s environmental legislation. President Trump has further labelled carbon footprints a ‘hoax’ and green energy a ‘scam’ before the United Nations Assembly, in addition to his other antagonisms aimed at the UN and allied nations. If the G7 must cooperate with the US, then removing climate change appears as a logical concession. Here we clearly see the clash between the practical need for all members to be present and agreeable, and the principle of shared concerns and ideology. Though practicality is prioritised, the decision to remove climate also speaks silently on politics. It is particularly telling of the G7’s relationship priorities centering the US, while also speaking to the status of climate in international negotiations.
The removal of climate change has clearly demonstrated the importance of the US’s participation in the G7, not only for its practical influence but for its political significance. President Trump has repeatedly attacked allied nations over a plethora of issues, such as immigration policy, criticism over involvement in the Russia-Ukraine and US-Iran wars, and climate policy. The president has even threatened invasion of allies’ territory, notably Greenland, which comes under the sovereign of Denmark, an EU nation. Yet, beyond verbal warnings, there is no consequence.
It is clear with the expulsion of Russia in 2014 for its annexation of the Crimea region that the G7 is not above forcing members’ removal. Indeed, excluding the US from a separate ‘G6’ meeting has been previously suggested. However, despite undermining the mutual agreement the G7 places its faith in, the significance of the US to the G7’s actual legitimacy to coordinate and suggest solutions takes precedence. As a result of this, maintaining at least a working relationship with the US is perceived as ‘must’ among G7 participants even over crucial, widely-accepted problems.
A lesser-discussed issue appears to be how the removal of climate change has impacted environmental policy. The US has disagreed with its allies for many reasons, one example being the recent conflict in Iran. As a result of allies’ supposed lack of support during the American campaign, President Trump has publicly criticised other nations and NATO. A leaked Pentagon email has threatened the expulsion of Spain from NATO and a ‘review’ of British sovereignty over the Falkland islands. On April 7th, Trump’s post on social media that Iran’s ‘civilisation will die tonight’ has been received particularly poorly (and rightly so). Despite this, discussions of Iran remain on the table.
The G7 agenda’s flexibility allows it to incorporate emerging issues, unlike set missions created by formal institutions. This means, though conflicts surrounding Iran have been unfolding during the conflict, it’s possible for them to be added, or removed, as members see fit. So far these have naturally gravitated towards protecting civilians rather than military contributions. However, such a glaring controversy has not been dismissed so publicly from negotiations as climate change has.
On the other hand, climate change was also removed from the agenda last year, in which a final G7 communiqué wasn’t even agreed, and with countries’ representatives described by the French Environment Minister as ‘traumatised’. The 2026 discussion of climate change has been delegated to COP and separate talks on specified issues such as methane production. Other sacrificial lambs at last year’s conference included all mention of trade, global health and poverty. The US will certainly not be represented by Trump forever, and to the credit of G7 sherpa teams, the impacts and solutions have been implied without explicit mention of climate change. However, it is undeniable that the political position of the US plays a key factor in their ability to throw out whole debates. The Trump administration has now used the US’s leverage to severely limit international alignment on climate change, twice.
Climate change has never stood on the same footing as economic or security policy, a fact the Y7’s communiqué highlights among its first points. Despite being higher on the agenda in the last few decades, in both domestic politics and international talks, climate discussions are often still viewed as a luxury. It is true that the G7 has overall retained an economic focus since its inception, although this hasn’t stopped branching out into social and geopolitical issues. As far as the UK electorate is concerned, immigration and the cost of living are far more pressing. The argument has been made that it is only natural given that such issues with direct consequences for human lives will always take precedence over that of plants and animals.
However, issues begin to arise when we consider the interconnectedness of policy, in which the environment, security, the economy and more function as intertwined policy landscapes than isolated departments. It is particularly ironic that the G7’s youth engagement group dedicated to ‘fighting the polycrises’ is met by a G7 conference that has removed a key global crisis from discussion.
From my own experience in negotiations, the crossovers between ecological crises, demographic imbalances, technology and security were brought up in every meeting. It is extremely difficult to discuss the expansion of the use of AI, and the construction of data centres, without considering the difficulties and impacts in the use of freshwater, land, energy systems, heat output, resource recycling, and critical minerals used to build hardware. Discussions of critical mineral and natural resource mining in my negotiations inevitably brought up geopolitical imbalances and historic colonial relationships between countries. For this reason, it is clearly more complicated than a simple choice between human problems and environmental problems when policies addressing both are contingent on one another. The quality of innovation and change, in not only the efficacy and intelligence of the machine or policy but also the benefits it brings people’s lives in 2, 10, and 50 years, is just as important as the quantity.
The removal of climate change from the G7 agenda is as much a political statement as a practical necessity, and one which raises particular questions on the relevance of the G7. Criticism of the conference’s waning influence can further challenge consensus diplomacy as a whole.
The legitimacy and efficiency of the G7 has been under scrutiny for years. One major criticism is its lack of representativeness. Its limited membership already has a large European bias via the inclusion of France, Germany, Italy and the EU itself. Although non-member countries are frequently invited as guest participants, their agency is limited. This coincides with the decline in geopolitical weight of some of the G7’s major players, which includes the UK. The gap in wealth and organisational capabilities between the US and other members is also too large to discount, and this dynamic, as evidenced before, is felt keenly. Due to this, scholars have repeatedly questioned the G7’s ability to steer global issues, both because of its lack of representation of key players, and US-imposed limitations.
A multitude of alternate conceptions of a G-type conference have been put forward as a result. A G6 organisation, excluding the US, has been floated as one such idea, although it’s understandable that no country would want to be seen leading such an alliance. Other possible rearrangements into a G2, G3, or even a G-zero in which no country has any political or economic leverage, have all been suggested. Alternatively, the slow fade of the G7 into oblivion, replaced by the G20 or regional partnerships with greater influence and capacity is another potential route. What all solutions seem to agree and hinge on is the G7’s current reliance and appeasement of the US as a weakness.
What solutions may not consider is that it is the structure of the negotiations, consensus itself, that is causing faults to appear. Finding common ground is a tried and tested golden rule of diplomacy. However, at the point where coming to a complete consensus means eliminating core global issues, it seems to become less worth it. Even worse if this allows the undermining of all members’ values such as commitments to aiding poorer countries or protecting our planet. If the practicalities of achieving complete consensus begin to work in opposition to the purpose of consensus, which is to unify on shared concerns and policy, it severely questions the effectiveness of consensus diplomacy in this context. In other words, if the G7 is at best contingent on and at worst destabilised by its most essential player, consensus is, shown in the 2025 lack of communiqué, impossible.
I do not argue that the G7 should disappear entirely. There’s an equally strong counter-argument that the G7 will continue to be relevant, especially as other rising partners such as South Korea are brought in, helping to balance the current European leaning. Out of the G7 has come some great wins, including joint condemnation of the Russia-Ukraine war, trade agreements, and vital organising during the COVID pandemic. The Y7 itself has previously produced excellent outcomes, including placing mental health onto the G7 agenda for the first time. The informality of the G7 has often played into negotiations well, allowing flexible discussions and a relaxed environment for ministers and state leaders. There’s also a valid point to be made about the opportunities provided to engagement groups and delegations. In 2015, the G7 conference in Elmau, Germany involved 3000 delegates, a number that has certainly only increased. As a method of promoting cross-cultural dialogue and exchange, at a state and grassroots level, the G7 remains useful.
Instead, it is perhaps the nature of the G7’s shared value negotiations themselves that are being challenged. Massive multilateral agreements have rapidly declined, and when they do occur, it is typically through formal institutions with real power to command military and social action. Of the remaining informal, multilateral conferences, the G20 has arguably sustained its relevance due to its organisation around shared issues, bringing together countries of sometimes opposite priorities and values to convene a global solution. This does not mean that the G20 is nearly as flexible nor rid of infighting, demonstrated by the threats of exclusion leveraged at South Africa by President Trump last year. However, their efficacy and representativeness is not as reliant on the US relationship, and therefore does not allow challenge as easily. It seems that a system based on shared values is limited to organisations that have checks on power, such as the EU. Without binding agreements on the conduct of members, organisations such as the G7 can be forced to compromise their principles to retain their most powerful players, and thus produce outcomes at all.
I am incredibly intrigued by the upcoming outcomes of the 2026 G7 summit in Evian, an event which I hope the words of me and my fellow youth delegates make a genuine impact.