Editor’s Note: This piece is brought to you by Vincenz Bill, a Master’s graduate from the University of St Andrews, research analyst with Project Khthon, and most recently a trainee with the EU in Brussels. Be sure to follow his work, here.
On the 27th of February, the public received the final results of the most important election in recent German history. This election was more than just a determination of seat distribution in the Bundestag: It was the culmination of years of frustration by a majority of the German electorate fed up with a dysfunctional government, increasing inflation, migration concerns, a cost-of-living crisis, and a stagnating economy. Although the AfD became the second strongest party in the Bundestag with 20% of the votes, they will not participate in government, as all other parties have publicly vowed to block them out. The CDU, winning 28% of the vote, will be able to form a Grand Coalition (the name coming from the same coalition under Angela Merkel) with the SPD, who garnered a measly but sufficient 16%.
This is a critical time, not just for Germany itself, but for its allies and particularly the UK. Both an incoming CDU government under Friedrich Merz, as well as Keir Starmer’s Labour government, are under immense pressure to deliver on their campaign promises. Radical parties in both countries are gaining traction, seeing as both Nigel Farage’s Reform UK and Alice Weidel’s AfD came in fourth place and second place respectively during the last elections.
Some have pointed out that this is the last chance for traditional center parties to turn things around and regain voter confidence before the polarisation of political discourse sweeps a radical party into the seat of power. With this in mind, I want to provide a brief overview of some critical areas of engagement in German-British relations for the incoming CDU government.
1. Strengthening Security and Defense Cooperation
One of the most immediate impacts of a CDU-led government would be a stronger emphasis on transatlantic security and NATO cooperation, which aligns closely with the UK’s strategic priorities under Keir Starmer. The CDU has traditionally been more committed to defence spending and military modernization than the SPD, emphasising it as a priority for their incoming government, meaning Germany could accelerate its contributions to NATO’s European deterrence efforts, particularly in support of the Ukrainian war effort.
For the UK, this would present an opportunity to deepen bilateral security ties, including intelligence sharing, joint military training, and arms collaboration. London has pushed for stronger European security coordination outside the EU framework, and a CDU-led Germany might be more open to this, especially as Berlin seeks to strengthen its defense industry partnerships. However, the extent of UK-German military cooperation would still be shaped by wider EU defense initiatives, where Germany remains committed to deeper integration, possibly limiting British involvement.
At the same time, Germany under the CDU would likely take a firmer stance on global security challenges, including China’s growing influence. A marked increase in defence spending, along with the EU’s current efforts to coordinate defence procurement and military coordination, will be a priority for an incoming defence minister. This aligns with the UK’s evolving Indo-Pacific strategy, potentially leading to greater German-British coordination on economic security, counterintelligence, and supply chain resilience. However, Germany’s economic ties to China could still cause friction, as the CDU would likely aim to balance economic interests with security concerns more cautiously than Starmer’s government.
2. Economic and Trade Relations: A Pragmatic Reset?
Brexit remains a defining factor in German-British economic relations, yet a CDU victory could create conditions for a more constructive approach to bilateral trade. A CDU-led government could support efforts to improve the UK-EU Trade and Cooperation Agreement (TCA), making trade smoother in areas such as services, financial regulation, and supply chains. Given Germany’s strong manufacturing sector, particularly in automobiles and industrial goods, there could be renewed efforts to align regulatory standards to prevent disruptions. However, any deeper UK-EU trade integration would still require broader EU consensus, meaning the CDU’s influence would be limited.
Additionally, the CDU’s economic policy prioritises stability and fiscal conservatism, meaning Germany may be less inclined to push for aggressive EU-wide stimulus policies that align with Labour’s domestic economic strategies.
3. Challenges and Potential Frictions
Despite the likely improvements in security, trade, and diplomacy, some areas of divergence would persist. The CDU’s approach to European integration could clash with Starmer’s vision for a more flexible UK-EU relationship. If the CDU prioritizes deeper EU integration, for example through establishing an EU framework for defence procurement and military coordination, the UK may find itself sidelined despite improved bilateral ties.
Another potential area of friction is climate policy. While the CDU supports green transition policies, it is more market-driven and less interventionist than the SPD-Green coalition, meaning Germany and the UK could take different approaches to green subsidies, energy security, and industrial decarbonization.
The large unknown remains the exact composition of the German government, specifically the distribution of the ministries among the SPD and CDU leadership. It’s not yet clear to what extent the ideological and political differences between the parties would affect their approach towards the UK. However, assuming a scenario akin to the 2021 elections, it is likely that the CDU’s coalition partners would use their bargaining power during the coalition negotiations to place one of their own atop the powerful Foreign Ministry. This may well lead to internal conflict and could substantially inhibit the government from pursuing an internally cohesive foreign policy. After all, coalition bickering over foreign policy is nothing new: it would be all too reminiscent of Chancellor Scholz’s numerous public interferences with his Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock’s policy toward Ukraine and Israel.
Final Thoughts
To be sure, many things are still unclear: Although the CDU has declared in before the elections that they clearly intend to work together with the UK particularly on security and migration issues, which are at the top of the agenda on both sides of the channel, many issues spanning from transatlantic relations to the UK’s role as a trade partner to the EU single-market, are still in the air.
What is clear, however, is that this is a historic opportunity for both governments to show their citizens that the radical parties do not have the answer, and that the traditional center-right and center-left parties can still deliver for their people, despite all of numerous challenges facing them. If they fail, and both Starmer and Merz have acknowledged this, they may have finally opened the door for a far-right Prime Minister/Chancellor to take power.